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Eyeing Idols: Rabbinic Viewing
Practices in Late Antiquity
R AC H E L N E I S
I was crushed by their wandering heart that turned away from me, and
their wandering eyes that turned after their idols.
Ezekiel 6.9
The streets, the market, the baths, the taverns, even our houses are
none of them altogether clear of idols. The whole world is filled with
Satan and his angels.1
Tertullian, De Spectaculis 8.9
WE ARE TOLD THAT PAUL, while walking through Athens, was ‘‘pro-
voked in spirit’’ when he ‘‘saw (theōrountos) the city was full of idols (katei-
dōlon).’’2 Through Paul’s affronted eyes we get a glimpse of how people
in the late antique Mediterranean liked to see their gods. One way of
doing this was by rendering them in material form: in statues, in paint-
ings, in mosaics, in temples, on street-altars, on vessels, on bathhouse
walls, over gateways and above entrances. However, the notion that sight
was a fundamental means by which to access the divine did not necessar-
ily lead to a theology of images. Philo, another first-century Jew, makes
it very clear that the eyes, while crucial to the discovery of and journey
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1. Tertullian, Disciplinary, Moral, and Ascetical Works, trans. R. Arbesmann et
al. (Washington, D.C., 1959), 69.
2. Acts 17.16.
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toward divinity, must not stop at the material realm but must reach
beyond to acquire true vision.3 Like Paul, and in equally strong terms,
Philo repudiated idolatry or material representations of the divine.
While the Jewish critique of, and rebuke against, certain divine images
was hardly new to Paul or Philo, what begins to surface in their writings
and what gains currency in the writings of later Jews and Christians is a
concern that is more specifically about looking at idols. In this essay I hope
to show that this concern was triggered by a twofold problem. One aspect
of the problem was a broad sensitivity toward the dangers of sight itself.
From this perspective, ‘‘idols’’ were among a variety of potentially prob-
lematic objects that crowded the visual field of a late antique person. The
other part of the problem pertained to the viewing of sacred images per
se.
‘‘Idols’’ are a subclass of those things we call ‘‘images.’’ Images them-
selves are only a subclass of ‘‘visual objects,’’ which include anything visi-
ble to the eye.4 By the term ‘‘images’’ I mean material objects such as
statues, paintings, frescoes, mosaics, and reliefs.5 The so-called Jewish
problem of images was not necessarily about images per se but about
those images designated as ‘‘idols.’’6
On one level, I am concerned with how such images or ‘‘idols’’ make
their way into texts. Texts—in this case, late antique rabbinic texts—have
a role to play beyond corroborating material evidence. They can supply
answers to certain kinds of questions about images and viewing habits
that the extant images alone do not necessarily guarantee.7 This point is
3. Philo, Spec. Laws 3.34–35; Migration 29; Unchangeable 19.
4. For the point that the image is not the quintessential visual object, see Wil-
liam J. Thomas Mitchell, ‘‘Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture,’’ in Art
History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies, ed. M. A. Holly and K. Moxey (Williamstown,
Mass., 2002), 231–50.
5. In contemporary terms we might use the term ‘‘art.’’
6. This distinction is made by Steven Fine, Art and Judaism in the Greco-Roman
World: Toward a New Jewish Archaeology (Cambridge, 2005), esp. 60–81. Most claim
that both textual evidence and the relative dearth of material evidence of figura-
tive art from the late Second Temple period indicate strict observance of the
second commandment. For an account that questions this view, see Eric Meyers,
‘‘Jewish Art and Architecture in the Land of Israel, 70–c. 235,’’ in The Cambridge
History of Judaism: Late Roman-Rabbinic Period, ed. S. T. Katz (Cambridge, 2006),
174–90. Most concede that by the second century C.E. we begin to see a distinc-
tively permissive attitude toward images among the Jews in the material evi-
dence.
7. For this approach, see Jaś Elsner, Roman Eyes: Visuality and Subjectivity in
Art and Text (Princeton, N.J., 2007), 21–22.
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consonant with the shift in the practice of art history away from the anal-
ysis of objects (in terms of connoisseurship, technique, style, and even
iconography) toward an analysis of the habits, practices, framing devices,
and modalities through which viewers give life to images—in other
words, from a history of images to a history of looking.8
I refer to a history of looking in its cultural sense rather than to vision
as an unchanging capacity reducible to a stable physiological account. As
David Michael Levin puts it, ‘‘Vision has a history and this history is one
of both seeing and of making things to be seen.’’9 Terms like ‘‘visuality,’’
‘‘viewing practices or habits,’’ ‘‘modes of seeing,’’ or what the art historian
Michael Baxandall called ‘‘the period eye,’’ indicate the ways in which
meanings, understandings, and seeing itself shift according to differing
cultural conditions.10 Thus, in the Renaissance, developments in mathe-
matics and architecture, particularly the invention of single-point per-
spective, gave rise to new ways not only of representing the visual but
also of experiencing it.11 Likewise, in the nineteenth century, emergent
representational and scientific technologies made for new ways of under-
standing how vision worked and new modes of seeing itself.12
Late Antiquity has been subject to a ‘‘visual turn,’’ both as a scholarly
trend and as a characterization of the period itself.13 This has mostly
focused on Greco-Roman modes of viewing, whether in terms of repre-
sentational and stylistic shifts between the late Roman and early Byzan-
tine period or in terms of new forms of visual piety in Christian circles
emerging in the fourth century. Rabbinic texts, in turn, provide a rich
8. See Norman Byrson’s introduction to Looking In: The Art of Viewing, ed. M.
Bal (New York, 2001), 1–40; and Michael Hatt and Charlotte Klonk, Art History:
A Critical Introduction to Its Methods (Manchester, 2006), 185.
9. David Michael Kleinberg-Levin, Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision
(Berkeley, Calif., 1993), 129.
10. Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy: A
Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style (Oxford, 1972), 29–103.
11. Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, trans. C. Wood (New York,
1997); originally published as ‘‘Die Perspektive Als Symbolische Form,’’ Vorträge
der Bibliothek Warburg 1924–25 (1927): 258–330.
12. Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1990).
13. Recent examples of this work include Patricia Cox Miller, The Corporeal
Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Ancient Christianity (Philadelphia, 2009);
James A. Francis, ‘‘Living Icons: Tracing a Motif in Verbal and Visual Represen-
tation from the Second to Fourth Centuries C.E,’’ American Journal of Philology
124.4 (2003): 575–600; Georgia Frank, The Memory of the Eyes: Pilgrims to Living
Saints in Christian Late Antiquity (Berkeley, Calif., 2000).
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corpus of responses and attempts to frame and tame that which is seen.
These sources exclude or occlude certain perspectives, persons, and
objects from their purview. Precisely because of their partial vision, rab-
binic writings allow us to account for the rabbis’ viewing habits as well
as to trace how they sought to legislate vision as part of a wider effort to
impose their perspective on their world.
One important example of the ways in which rabbinic sources make
images visible and viewing habits manifest, particularly as sites of conflict
and resistance, is through the concept and vocabulary of idolatry or ‘avo-
dah zarah. While the notion of idolatry is biblically based, one cannot
underestimate the ways in which the rabbis and others granted it ongoing
life and reinvention. Idols are obviously not born but are made in both
senses of construction.14 The web of rabbinic laws on idolatry itself situ-
ates the idolatrous nature of an image chiefly in the eye of the beholder
(rabbi, as well as worshiper). It is precisely this eye that is my focus here.
One reason why I choose to focus my inquiry on idols is because these
visual objects seem to have elicited a particular kind of visual response and
framing, not only on the part of ancient rabbis but also on that of modern
scholars. Idols are troubling images, having played an important role in the
writing of Jewish history and having served as a curious kind of red her-
ring. Their prohibition has given Jews a reputation for iconoclasm and
aniconism, and even for antipathy toward the sense of vision itself. Con-
versely, idols have been represented as a particularly Jewish vice.15 The
14. How different images were determined to be idols is not the concern here.
For work on the rabbis and idolatry, see (including bibliographic references
therein) Gerald Blidstein, ‘‘Rabbi Yohanan, Idolatry and Public Privilege,’’ Jour-
nal for the Study of Judaism 5.2 (1974): 154–61; Fine, Art and Judaism, 60–81;
Seth Schwartz, ‘‘The Rabbi in Aphrodite’s Bath: Palestinian Society and Jewish
Identity in the High Roman Empire,’’ in Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity,
the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire, ed. S. Goldhill (Cambridge,
2001), 335–61; 99–115; Yair Furstenberg, ‘‘Idolatry Annulment: Rabbinic
Dialogue with Paganism under the Roman Empire’’ (Hebrew), Reshit: The Shalom
Hartman Institute Academic Annual 1 (2009): 117–44; Ishay Rosen-Zvi, ‘‘The
Polemic on the Obligation to Destroy Idolatry in Tannaitic Literature’’ (He-
brew), Reshit: The Shalom Hartman Institute Academic Annual 1 (2009): 91–116;
Emmanuel Friedheim, ‘‘Historical Studies on the Sages’ Halakhic Negotiation
with Greco-Roman Culture in Mishnaic and Talmudic Israel’’ (Hebrew), AJS
Review 33.2 (2009): 1–18; Richard Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia: Between Persia and
Roman Palestine (New York, 2006), 103–20.
15. See Jeremy Cohen, ‘‘The Jews as Killers of Christ in the Latin Tradition,
from Augustine to the Friars,’’ Traditio 39 (1983): 8–10, 22.
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rhetorical figure of the sacrilegious, blind, or idolatrous Jew has yet to be
utterly dislodged from our own historical lenses.16
The ancient rabbis are often the locus classics of this supposed antipa-
thy toward images (and, by logically fallacious extension, vision more
broadly). Others have already complicated the picture of the late antique
‘‘artless Jew’’ and the iconophobic rabbi.17 I wish to show how even the
most ‘‘extreme’’ forms of rabbinic disengagement with ‘‘idols’’ partook in
the contemporary visual koine.
At the risk of oversimplification, but at the gain of categorical conve-
nience and clarity, one might talk of three rabbinic modes of idol-viewing.
The first is ‘‘halakhic forensics.’’ Rabbinic sources, especially in the tract-
ate ‘Avodah Zarah, provide a rabbis’-eye view onto a world full of religious
objects, images, statues, and gods. Whether deliberately or inadvertently,
the rabbis attended to and recorded various details of the appearances of
objects. This is part of the wider realm of visual discernment through
which the rabbis attempt to identify and categorize things in the world,
for epistemic and evidentiary purposes. However—and this is the main
reason that I am not treating this mode here—the act of viewing in this
case is only treated implicitly through description and presentation of
graphic details of visual objects, but it is not addressed, described, or
announced, in and of itself.18
The second viewing strategy might be simply termed ‘‘looking away.’’
The third strategy, ‘‘looking awry,’’ addresses one problem that surfaces
16. See, e.g., John 9.40–41; 2 Cor 3.14–16; Justin Martyr, The Dialogue with
Trypho 67.8; Tertullian, Against the Jews 12, 13; Edward Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks
before the Blind: Medieval Constructions of a Disability (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2010),
65–67; Averil Cameron, ‘‘The Language of Images: The Rise of Icons and Chris-
tian Representation,’’ Studies in Church History 28 (1992): 1–42. On Augustine’s
comparison of Jewish literalism or blindness to their own texts with gentile idola-
ters, see Robert Markus, Signs and Meanings: World and Text in Ancient Christianity
(Liverpool, 1996), 25–27.
17. See From Dura to Sepphoris: Studies in Jewish Art and Society in Late Antiquity,
Journal of Roman Archaeology 40, ed. L. I. Levine and Z. Weiss (Portsmouth, R.I.,
2000); Fine, Art and Judaism; Kalman Bland, The Artless Jew: Medieval and Modern
Affirmations and Denials of the Visual (Princeton, N.J., 2000).
18. This is not always the case with halakhic forensics. Examples in which the
forensic eye is explicitly thematized include laws of niddah, witness testimony and
evidence, observation of rabbis’ actions for halakhic determinations. Charlotte
Fonrobert attends to vision in menstrual matters in Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert,
Menstrual Purity: Rabbinic and Christian Reconstructions of Biblical Gender (Stanford,
Calif., 2000), 16–17, 96, 154.
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with ‘‘looking away.’’ By not looking one might actually be affirming the
power of the ‘‘idol’’ and granting it a grudging sanctity. We will see how
this potential critique of ‘‘looking away’’ surfaces in the Palestinian Tal-
mud. An alternative would be to deliberately engage the image through
the eyes in a way that negated reverential gazing and neutralized the
image’s power by ‘‘looking awry.’’ A mode related to ‘‘looking awry’’ is
‘‘liturgical looking’’—a viewing practice in which the visual object is seen
and ritually encoded with a curse.
In this essay I will concentrate on examples of ‘‘looking away’’ and
‘‘looking awry,’’ with a brief look at ‘‘liturgical looking.’’ I argue that all
these viewing modes—even, or especially, ‘‘looking away’’—were attuned
to contemporaneous ideas about the physical and spiritual mechanics of
vision in general, and as they pertained to sacred images in particular.19
LOOKING AWAY
‘‘Do not turn (tifnu) toward the idols’’ (Lev 19.4).
A. Do not turn to worship them.
B. R. Judah says: do not turn to see them (lir’otan) literally (vada’y).20
This tannaitic source attempts to explain the biblical prohibition in Lev
19.4.21 The first interpretation reads ‘‘turn’’ (p–n–y/h) in the sense of turn-
ing toward in worship. R. Judah claims to understand p–n–h in its literal
sense (vada’y), thus reading the verse as a prohibition against the very
looking at idols.
19. I will be focusing on Palestinian sources here. I treat the relevant Babylo-
nian sources in my book The Sense of Sight in Rabbinic Culture (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, forthcoming).
20. Sifra Kedoshim 1 (ed. Weiss, 87a); par. tShab 17.1.
21. Lev 4.19 is a curious basis for a visual prohibition of idolatry. While the
Pentateuch rarely talks of idolatry in such terms, other more obvious examples
are Num 15.39 and Deut 4.19. Ezekiel tends to imprecate against idolatry in
ocular terms (esp. ‘‘raising the eyes’’)’’ (e.g., Ez 6.9; 18.6, 12, 15; 14.4, 7; 20.7, 24;
33.25). Another possible instance in which idolatry and vision are linked is Ps
101.3. In general terms this expression refers to an intentional ‘‘activation of the
eye’’ rather than to a literal elevation of the gaze. See Stefan C. Reif, ‘‘A Root to
Look Up? A Study of the Hebrew NS’ ‘YN,’’ in Congress Volume: Salamanca 1983,
ed. J. A. Emerton (Leiden, 1985), 230–44, and references to earlier works cited
therein. When referring to deities it denotes supplication, reverence or worship’’
(cf. Is 40.26, Ps 121.1, Ps 123.1). More common terms related to idol-worship
are ‘‘service,’’ ‘‘sacrifice,’’ and ‘‘prostration.’’ The majority of statements regarding
idolatry constitute instructions to refrain from their construction, to desist from
their worship and to destroy them (i.e., Ex 20.2–4; Ex 23.14; Ex 34.13–17; Num
33.52; Deut 5.6–8; Deut 7.5, 25, 26; Deut 12.1–4; Jgs 2.2; 2 Kgs 11.18, 19.18).
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There are several ways to understand R. Judah’s intervention. It could
be extending the reach of the prohibition in A by enacting a precaution-
ary measure so that even actions short of worship (such as looking) are
prohibited.22 Another possibility is that R. Judah specifically focuses on
vision as something meaningfully related to idolatry. His interpretation
may point to looking part of what it means ‘‘to worship’’ (in A). Before
weighing in on these possibilities let us unpack R. Judah’s apparently
simple intervention.
As a hermeneutic term, vada’y signals that the relevant interpretation
follows the ‘‘plain meaning’’ of the biblical text, sometimes in contrast to
a figurative reading.23 Thus R. Judah’s reading is marked as consistent
with the literal meaning of p–n–y, so that the command al tifnu el ha-’elilim
directly forbids looking at idols.24 The root p–n–y commonly means to
‘‘turn’’ in either literal or figurative senses (as in A); in some contexts it
can have the narrower meaning of ‘‘look’’ (as in B).25
In this particular case to ‘‘turn’’ would conform to the ‘‘plain meaning’’
of the text as much as, if not more than, to ‘‘look.’’26 R. Judah’s ostensibly
22. Eli‘ezer b. Samuel of Metz sees R. Judah as elaborating rather than con-
tradicting the statement in A. See Sefer yere’im ha-shalem (Jerusalem, 1973), 351
(cited in Lieberman, Tosefta ki-fshutah, 3:282).
23. On the term vada’y as plain meaning, see David Weiss Halivni, Peshat and
Derash: Plain and Applied Meaning in Rabbinic Exegesis (New York, 1991), 17–18,
76–77, and references in 197; Raphael Loewe, ‘‘The ‘Plain’ Meaning of Scripture
in Early Jewish Exegesis,’’ Papers of the Institute of Jewish Studies 1 (Jerusalem,
1964), 140–85; and Lieberman, Tosefta ki-fshutah, 3:282: ‘‘do not turn with your
face toward the idols in order to look at them.’’
24. If this is the case it is harder to argue that the Sifra presents R. Judah’s
interpretation as a precautionary, extra measure.
25. P–n–y in biblical Hebrew means ‘‘to face’’ or ‘‘to turn’’ in kal. See Francis
Brown, Samuel R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon of
the Old Testament (Oxford, 1907), 815–17; A. Even-Shoshan, Ha-milon he-h. adash
(Jerusalem, 1980), s.v. p–n–h. In some contexts it can mean ‘‘to look’’ (e.g., Ex
2.12, Ex 16.10; Num 12.10, 16.42, and see Dov Sadan, ‘‘On the Substitution of
the Term of ‘pniyah’ as an Expression of ‘re’iyah,’ ’’ [Hebrew], Sinai, 88.3/4 [1981]:
184–91). However, in its local context of Lev 19.4, p–n–y is not being used in its
visual sense. Lev 19.31 and the nearby Lev 20.6 use p–n–y to warn against ‘‘turn-
ing to’’ mediums and soothsayers. These instances use the root p–n–y in the sense
of ‘‘turn towards,’’ in a metaphorical or affective fashion rather than in the literal
sense ‘‘facing’’ or ‘‘looking.’’ However, early rabbinic midrash did not necessarily
concern itself with the larger contexts of meaning, preferring to treat smaller
units (words, phrases, verses) of the biblical text.
26. To my knowledge the characterization of ‘‘looking’’ as the common or
plain sense of the verb p–n–y is unusual in tannaitic sources. The Sifra provides
other interpretations of this verb including ‘‘turning towards in worship’’ (as per
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literal (and also hyperphysical) reading of the root is somewhat strained.
All this is to say that explaining the content of his prohibition as an unre-
markable hermeneutic reflex or standard rigorist precaution does not suf-
ficiently account for the particularity of claiming that a ban on looking at
idols plainly arises from Lev 19.4.27
The parallel in tShab 17.1 suggests that R. Judah’s interpretation is
not a run-of-the-mill rabbinic stringency:
A. Writing that goes under figures (tsurot) or icons (yokna’ot) one
does not look (en mistakelin) at it.28
B. And not only that, but even on weekdays one does not look (en
mistakelin) at icons, as it says, ‘‘do not turn towards the idols’’ (Lev
19.4).29
above) and ‘‘clearing away’’ (in its sense of vacate). The Targums and the Peshitta
on Lev 19.4 use the Aramaic cognate p–n–y but the fourth century C.E. Samaritan
Memar markah 3 has an emphatically visual reading, ‘‘and an image (pesel) or any
likeness (damah) that is not proper you shall not see. You shall not fill your eyes (lo
temale’ ‘enekha) on an evil altar.’’ See Ze’ev Ben-Hayyim, ed., Tibat Marke: A Collec-
tion of Samaritan Midrashim (Jerusalem, 1988). Pseudo-Jonathan, Neofiti and frag-
ments read Ex 2.12 as s–k–l (Onkelos uses the Aramaic cognate p–n–y). All targums
use the Aramaic cognate in Ex 16.10; and all but Neofiti marginalia read the cog-
nate for Lev 20.6 (the Neofiti marginalia has s–k–l); Pseudo-Jonathan and Neofiti
have s–k–l for Num 12.10; Onkelos and Neofiti have k–b–l and Pseudo-Jonathan,
Neofiti marginalia, P and V have s–k–l for Num 16.15; Onkelos uses p–n–y and
Pseudo-Jonathan and Neofiti have s–k–l for Deut 9.27. In general Onkelos prefers
p–n–y for p–n–h. Sokoloff gives ‘‘turn, remove, pour out, empty, release, complete’’
for p–n–y (Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine
Period [Baltimore, Md., 2003], 438).
27. The reading is sufficiently an imposition onto the verse-phrase for us to
seek explanations outside of rabbinic hermeneutic considerations alone.
28. The prohibition of looking (s–k–l) at inscriptions under images is noteworthy.
The common verb is reading (k–r–a), which literally means ‘‘cry out.’’ This reflects
the fact that in antiquity texts were usually read out loud. For the view that the
prohibition against ‘‘looking’’ refers to reading, see Lieberman, Tosefta ki-fshutah
2:282 and references therein. When one considers the way s–k–l is used again in
the second part of the sentence, this reinforces a visual understanding of the verb
(i.e., looking). Looking even without the ability to read would have been enough
in order to approximate the content of inscriptions under sacred images, which
usually contained dedications and, often, invocations of deities. As Lehmann puts
it, ‘‘One did not have to read the inscription to know that it contributed to the
Roman system of values,’’ Clayton Lehmann, ‘‘The City and the Text,’’ in Caesarea
Maritima: A Retrospective after Two Millennia, ed. A. Raban and K. G. Holum (Leiden,
1996), 388. Examples of ‘‘looking’’ at image-related inscriptions include Acts 17.23,
Mk 12.13–17. Cf. bShab 149a, which substitutes ‘‘look’’ for ‘‘read;’’ tShab 13.16.
29. The form ‘‘do not do X, and not only this, but do not do Y’’ appears
repeatedly in Shab. So does the form ‘‘do not do X on the Sabbath, and not only
this, but do not even do X during the week (e.g. tShab 2.9; 7.23; mShab 6.10;
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In this case, looking at legends underneath an image is forbidden on the
Sabbath, on top of a general weekday prohibition not to look at the
images themselves. There is no metahermeneutic gloss of vada’y even as
the Tosefta indicates the exegetical derivation by citing the lemma. In this
context, the purpose is to justify the ban on looking at idols rather than
to interpret the biblical phrase. As such, the ban against looking assumes
its own integrity here as an everyday baseline of acceptable behavior vis-
à-vis idolatrous images. There is no sense in which it is presented as a
precautionary ban designed to prevent one from ‘‘turning toward idols.’’30
In its language and its reference to legends beneath images, the Tosefta
gestures more to contemporaneous Greco-Roman visual, sculptural, and
inscriptional culture than to biblical hermeneutics.31
This brings us back to the possibility that R. Judah’s ban on looking
at idols may be a commentary on what it means ‘‘to turn to worship
them.’’32 It is noteworthy that in the third century, Hippolytus claimed
that the (first-century) Essenes did not ‘‘carry, look at (horān) or make
images (eikona).’’33 This possibility that looking alone was understood as
part of the worship of idols seems to be realized in later sources, as our
tannaitic tradition spawns and is linked to a line of rabbinic reasoning
that highlights the withholding of the gaze and its relationship to idolatry.
There is evidence that ancient Jews, and among them the tannaim,
understood that looking at certain visual objects (in general) could have
very real effects upon the beholder (or the object).34 Certainly, belief in
tShab 16.22). tShab 17.1 cannot be read (solely) in the context of bans on reading
business documents since the prohibition is against looking rather than reading.
Moreover, those prohibitions against reading on the basis of inappropriateness
for Sabbath tend to explicitly declare themselves as such, as do the precautionary
prohibitions (e.g., mShab 1.3; mShab 16.1; tShab 1.8). Compare the reading pro-
hibition in tShab 17.8, as well as the restriction on consulting figures for calcula-
tion from certain sources ‘‘as one does during the week,’’ in tShab 17.6. For
additional reading prohibitions, see mShab 16.1, tShab 1.13, tShab 13.1. For pro-
hibitions against carrying or showing commercial documents, see tShab 8.11, 13.
30. There is no implicitly figurative interpretation or contrast with ‘‘turn to
worship.’’
31. On the practice of placing inscriptions at the base of a statue, see John
Henderson, Pliny’s Statue: The Letters, Self-Portraiture and the Arts (Exeter, 2002),
33–36,163–64. Inscriptions often contained dedications invoking the gods or hon-
oring a person.
32. See SifreNum. 115 (ed. Horowitz, 126), s.v. Num 39.15: ‘‘and you shall
not go astray after your hearts and after your eyes, after which you go astray’’
links the gaze with heresy, lust, and idolatry.
33. Hippolytus, Book of Heresies, 9.26.1–2 (ed. M. Marcovich).
34. E.g., mZav 2.2 (arousal); LevR 20.1 (ed. Margaliot, 1:443–44), (memory);
tNaz 4.7, SifreNum 22 (arousal); mAvot 2.9 and 11, mAvot 5.13 and 19; tH. ag
2.3–4); tSot 1.7; LevR 23:13 (ed. Margaliot, 2:548); tBM 2.30, tHor 2.5
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the dangers of vision, exemplified in notions like the evil eye or the erotic
power of sight, is attested in early Roman Palestine and beyond.35 Under-
pinning such concerns about vision were both popular and philosophical
understandings of its workings.
ANCIENT VISUAL THEORY
In the ancient and late ancient world, vision was generally understood
to be intromissive (caused by something entering the eye), extramis-
sive (enabled by something coming out of the eye), or a combination
of both.36Atomists thought that vision was intromissive, believing that it
occurred through material eidōla or simulacra being conveyed from physi-
cal objects to the eye.37 Plato was an extramissive visual theorist whose
understanding of vision continued to have great currency in Late Antiq-
uity. He theorized that when there is light, a ‘‘visual current’’ issues from
the eye, coalesces with the light, and strikes the object of vision.38 He
believed that the object emanates particles and that ultimately the data is
transmitted to the soul. Stoic philosophy held that vision was a combina-
tion of visual currents that emitted from the eye and light. Rays emitted
by the eye were thought to interact with the illuminated air forming a
tensed field (in the shape of a cone). This ‘‘extension’’ of the eye touches
the shapes of objects and transmits the information back to the eye. Along
with Platonism, stoicism was a vital philosophical tradition in Late Antiq-
uity, informing ideas about vision from the Gospels to Galen.
(‘‘enlightening the eyes’’); yMK 3:1, 81d; SifreDt 343; Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ish-
mael, Bah. odesh 2 (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 210–11), and 9 (ed. Horowitz-Rabin,
235).
35. The concept of the evil eye is founded in an extramissive theory of vision.
See Sinai (Tamas) Turan,‘‘ ‘Wherever the Sages Set Their Eyes, There Is Either
Death or Poverty’: On the History, Terminology and Imagery of the Talmudic
Traditions about the Devastating Gaze of the Sages’’ (Hebrew), Sidra 23 (2008):
137–205; Richard Kalmin, ‘‘The Evil Eye in Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiq-
uity,’’ in Judaea/Palaestina, Babylon and Rome: Jews in the Roman, Parthian and Sas-
sanian Empires, ed. B. Isaac et al. (Tübingen, forthcoming). Unlike Turan, Kalmin
believes that ‘ayin ha-ra’ in tannaitic sources signifies stinginess and is not of the
‘‘magical’’ sort. For a discussion of the evil eye and visual theory in the early
Roman Empire, see Shadi Bartsch, The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-Knowledge
and the Gaze in the Early Roman Empire (Chicago, 2006), esp. 69–71.
36. See Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 7.7, ed. and trans. P. De Lacy
Corpus medicorum graecorum V 4, 1, 2 (Berlin, 1980), 472–75.
37. For example, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. Aristotle’s
theory of vision was also intromissive. His theory persisted through his late
antique commentators (such as Porphyry and Iamblichus), albeit through a filter
of Neoplatonism.
38. See Plato, Timaeus 45b–c.
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The highly influential Galen (129–200 C.E.) adopted and adapted ele-
ments of stoic understandings of vision (together with the findings of the
Alexandrian anatomists such as Rufus of Ephesus). He argued that visual
spirit (or pneuma) comes from the eye, which combines with the air to
‘‘become for us the kind of instrument that the nerve in the body is at all
times.’’39
All of these ancient theories of how the eye works assume an intertwin-
ing between vision and touch, and a corporeal contact between viewer
and visual object. Hence the malevolent gaze can negatively impact what
is seen, and the seductive gaze or striking object can stimulate or affect
the visual object or subject. Evidence from all levels of cultural produc-
tion from the elite and rarified to the more popular and widespread—
including medical and gynecological writings, optics, mathematics,
philosophy, romances, magical materials, graffiti, religious texts, and
material artifacts—shows that some combination of these ideas were cur-
rent in the cultural koine of the late antique Mediterranean and Near
East.40
Such notions of sight also operated in a variety of Greek Jewish
sources.41 For instance, Philo worked with platonic notions of sight. He
not only granted it a central role in his religious philosophy but also pre-
sented it as a peculiarly Jewish capacity. He describes the vision of the
divine as the eyes ‘‘touching the Eternal.’’42 In his account of Gaius’s
attempt to erect his image in the Jerusalem Temple, Philo also considers
the perils of vision. Petronius, who was to carry out Gaius’s order, knows
that the Jews,
39. Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 7.5, p. 461. On the eye as sentient
rather than a mere transmitter of data, see Gerard Simon, Le Regard, l’être et l’ap-
parance dans l’optique de l’Antiquité (Paris, 1988).
40. The evidence for these theories is ubiquitous and varied, ranging from
Ptolemy’s Optics to Galen’s On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body, Pliny’s Natural
Histories, Achilles Tatius’s Leucippe and Clitophon, Vergil’s Aeneid, and many magical
charms amulets and spells that invoke the eye (good or evil). The enormous sec-
ondary literature on this topic includes Morales, Vision and Narrative; Frank, Mem-
ory of the Eyes, 114–33.
41. For the appearance of certain beings as a bodily source of light, heat, or
fire, see Joseph and Asaneth 14, Revelation 19.12; 2 Enoch 39; 3 Enoch 15. For
sources that highlight a link between vision and desire, see Matt 5.28, 6.22; Joseph
and Asaneth 23.1–2; T. Reuben 3.10, 4.1, 6.1.
42. Philo, Abr. 76. On Philo’s use of Platonic physiological theories of vision,
see Maren Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture (Tübingen, 2001), 198. See
also Gerhard Delling, ‘‘The One Who Sees God,’’ in Nourished with Peace: Studies
in Hellenistic Judaism in Memory of Samuel Sandmel, ed. F. E. Greenspahn, E. Hil-
gert, and B. L. Mack (Chico, Calif., 1984), 27–41.
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understanding their laws to be oracles delivered by God, and having
been taught this lesson from the earliest age, they carry as a statue in
their souls (agalmatophorousi) the images (eikonas) of the ordained laws.
Then, beholding (kathorōntes) the visible (enargeis) figures and forms of
these, they are continually amazed at them.43
These heart-borne images of the Torah laws elicit a positive form of visual
piety that is contrasted with the negative and idolatrous beholding of
Gaius’s images. Philo’s Jewish leaders refuse to even look upon the latter,
declaring that they would rather have their eyes (ophthalmois) struck out
before ‘‘seeing (theasōmetha) what no one of our ancestors ever saw
(eide).’’44 In order to emphasize the very real effect that beholding idola-
trous images would have upon their sensory and spiritual sensibilities,
they invoke the Gorgon:45
Consider, if some of our people should see (theasainto) the statue (andri-
anta) escorted through into the shrine, would they not turn into stones,
with their joints becoming frozen, their eyes (ophthalmōn) becoming
frozen, so that they were unable to move?46
Here is a graphic example of intromissive visual theory in which seeing
an object has a mimetic effect upon the beholder: by beholding a statue
the (literally) petrified viewer becomes one.47
The seriousness with which vision was taken was bound up with its
haptic nature. Sensitivity to sight is at play in Philo and in the writings
of the early Church fathers. Writing in North Africa and in Egypt around
the end of the second century, Tertullian and Clement focused on vio-
lence (the spectacles) and sex (women, idolatrous images) as dangerous
visual objects. Tertullian argues that if we are careful about what goes
into our mouths and stomachs, we should surely keeping our ‘‘nobler
organs’’ free from the defilement of idolatry and that we ought to have no
43. Philo Legat. 31.210–12 (L. Cohn et al., Philonis Alexandrini opera quae super-
sunt [1915, repr., Berlin, 1962], 6:155–223); trans. based on F. H. Colson, Philo,
On the Embassy to Gaius (Cambridge, 1962), with minor changes.




47. Compare Gregory of Nyssa, Commentary on the Song, Sermon 5, ed. H.
Langerbeck and W. Jaeger (Leiden, 1960), 147; cf. Plato, Phaedrus 253a.
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part ‘‘whether by beholding or watching, in what we renounce.’’48 In his
exhortation to virgins to cover their heads, Tertullian is even more
explicit regarding the relationship between vision and touch, describing
how the uncovered virgin is ‘‘penetrated by the gaze of untrustworthy
and multitudinous eyes.’’49 The Palestinian amoraim would have recourse
to similarly graphic understandings of the (male) gaze.
Clement of Alexandria advises that ‘‘the eyes especially are to be spar-
ingly used, since it is better to slip with the feet than with the eyes.’’50 He
cautions that ‘‘languishing looks, and ogling, which is to wink with the
eyes, is nothing else than to commit adultery with the eyes, lust skirmish-
ing through them.’’51 On the other hand, he admits that ‘‘the eye contem-
plating beautiful objects (kala) gladdens the heart; that is, the eye which
has learned rightly (kalōs) to see, gladdens.’’52 Rabbis and Christians
attempted to guard their prospective followers’ eyes from risky objects
about the landscape, understanding that ‘‘good’’ seeing not only entailed
vigilance but was something that required cultivation.53
LOOKING AS WORSHIP
If late ancient notions of vision underscored sight’s sensitivity, then per-
haps the important role that this sense assumed in the realm of the sacred
is unsurprising. It is by now a commonplace that central to late antique
religion was the impulse to ‘‘see the gods,’’ whether in sculpture, painting,
dream, or apparition.54 We see this desire played out from the biblical
48. De Spectaculis 13, trans. R. Arbesmann; Tertullian: The Disciplinary, Moral
and Ascetical Works, 81–82. For rabbinic notions of consumptive vision, see mMid
4.5 and LevR 23.13 (ed. Margaliot, 2:548).
49. Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins, 14, trans. S. Thelwall, in ed. A. Roberts
and J. Donaldson, vol. 4, Ante-Nicene Fathers (Peabody, Mass., 1994), 36. The
dangers of lustful looking are enhanced when the visual object is a sentient being,
but in principle other visual objects could be affected by the gaze.
50. Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus 4, trans. W. Wilson, in ed., A. Roberts
and J. Donaldson, vol. 2, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (New York, 2007), 288.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. This visual vigilance flowers in post-tannaitic writings and is productive
as well as prohibitive. For the rewards of not looking at certain objects, see LevR
23.13 and bMeg 28a.
54. James Francis shows that this visual engagement with divine images
emerges in the first few centuries of the Common Era. See Francis, ‘‘Living
Icons,’’ 575–600. On the gap between looking at the god directly and looking at
its image, see Arnobius of Sicca, The Case against the Pagans, 2:460. On seeing the
image of a god in a dream as equivalent to seeing the god himself, see Artemi-
dorus of Daldis, Oneirocritica 2.33, 35, 37, 38, 39.
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psalms, to ancient Greek pilgrimage rituals, to a flurry of second- and
third-century sources including Lucian’s De Dea Syria, Pausanias’s de-
scriptions of statues’ display or concealment, and Philostratus’s descrip-
tions of images.55 The same is true for rabbinic traditions about the
pilgrimage sights in the halcyon Temple days.
In the third century, Plotinus exploited the importance of the visual,
sensory, and material nature of the divine images in his mystical philoso-
phy. He commended the sages of old for this way of capturing the eidos,
form or image of the gods in matter.56 Almost a century later Julian viv-
idly expressed the delight in seeing images, particularly those of the gods:
Therefore, too, whoever loves the gods, does he not gaze steadfastly
(horōntas) upon the statues (agalmata) and the images (eikonas) of the
gods, worshipping and at the same time shuddering at the gods looking
at him (horōntas) from the unknown (lit. unseen, aphanous).57
Seeing is bound up with pleasure, deep affect, and physical responsiveness.
It is a reciprocal experience in which one not only sees but is also seen.
All of this points to a flowering of what Elsner calls ‘‘mystic’’ or ‘‘ritual-
centered viewing.’’58 Elsner shows how cult images from the second century
mandated this viewing. He notes an increase of symbolic (rather than natu-
ralistic) depiction of figures in cultic contexts from late Roman to Byzantine
periods (that ultimately culminated in the Christian visual idiom of the
icon). These, with their frontal gaze, incorporate the viewer, ‘‘eyeballing
those that approach into submission.’’59 Key to this sacred viewing is a
shared gaze between viewer and image.60 That the tannaim thought of the
divine-human ocular encounter in terms of a reciprocal vision of this kind
comes through in their (re)invention of the thrice-yearly pilgrimage, partic-
ularly in what they designated as re’iyah or re’ayon:61
55. My discussion of Greco-Roman visual pieties is indebted to Francis, ‘‘Liv-
ing Icons,’’ 575–600, and to Elsner, Roman Eyes, 1–28.
56. Plotinus, Enneads IV.3.11. See Francis, ‘‘Living Icons,’’ 584–85.
57. Oration on the Mother of the Gods 294c–d, trans. W. C. Wright in Loeb
2.310–11 Bidez-Cumont, Ep. 89b, Budé 1.2.162. Francis emphasizes that
Julian stressed the distinction between the images and the gods themselves (‘‘Liv-
ing Icons,’’ 584–93). However, the line between image and the god was not
always so clear; see Elsner, Roman Eyes, 1–28.
58. Elsner, Roman Eyes, 3 and passim.
59. Ibid., 22.
60. See Lucian, De Syria Dea, 32; Elsner, Roman Eyes, 23–24.
61. On the physically reciprocal nature of this encounter, see Aharon Shem-
esh, ‘‘ ‘The Holy Angels Are in Their Council’: The Exclusion of Deformed Per-
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‘‘He will see the face of the Lord (Ex 23.14)’’—just as he comes to see
(yir’eh) so he comes to be seen (yera’eh).62
In such a visual economy, one way out, perhaps the only way, is to disen-
gage the eyes. The prohibition of looking per se would make sense—even
beyond rigorisms—in a world in which vision is no casual affair and in
which seeing is essential to the ritual experience of the sacred.
AVERTING THE GAZE IN THE YERUSHALMI
The rabbis increasingly worked with such notions of sight to picture and
frame a world of their own. We see a marked turn toward the visual by
the amoraim, as well as explicit invocation of visual theories, and in our
particular case of idol-viewing, an expansion of ocular options available.63
In the later sources we find the ban on looking embedded and modified in
new settings. The prohibition is limited to ‘‘idolatrous’’ images in certain
contexts, and there may be cause to look if the circumstances are right.
A. Asyan the carpenter in the name of R. Yoh. anan: Why are the images
(ikoniyot) forbidden? Because they offer incense to them at the time
that they go up.
B. Said R. Yoh. anan: it is permitted to look at them (liro’tan) at the time
that they go down.
Why? ‘‘When the wicked are cut off you shall look (tir’eh).’’ (Ps 37.34)
C. Writing that goes under figures and images one does not look (mis-
takelin) at them on the Sabbath.
And furthermore one does not even look (mistakelin) at images (be-
ikonot) on weekdays.
What is the reason? ‘‘Do not turn towards the gods’’ (Lev 19.14)—do
not turn to worship them.
R. Judah says: do not turn to see them (lir’otan) literally (mamash).64
Prior to this passage the Yerushalmi narrows the underlying Mishnah’s
prohibitions against images to those that have been presumptively wor-
sons from Holy Places in Qumranic and Rabbinic Literature,’’ Dead Sea Discoveries
4 (1997): 179–206, esp. 189–90.
62. SifreDt 143 (ed. Finkelstein, 196).
63. This is an instance of a much broader trend toward a richer engagement
with and deployment of the visual in the realms of piety, theology, and sociality
in rabbinic culture, which I treat in The Sense of Sight.
64. yAZ 3.1, 42b. Talmud Yerushami According to Ms. Or. 4720 (Scal. 3) of the
Leiden University Library with Restorations and Corrections (Jerusalem, 2001), 1393–
94. Unless otherwise noted, I cite from this manuscript.
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shipped.65 Besides determining which objects are forbidden, the Yerus-
halmi seeks to discover which acts are proscribed (whether they con-
stitute worshipful behavior or benefit, hana’ah).66
The initial prohibitive logic in A depends on the occurrence on cultic
activity. R. Yoh. anan works on the presumption that incense is offered to
a cult image upon its erection. Even after a cult image had been conse-
crated, offerings of fruit, incense, flowers, cakes, wine, or grain were pre-
sented to objects (ranging from imperial images to small paintings of
domestic gods to grander statues of divine beings).67
The ensuing tradition in B, also attributed to R. Yoh. anan, implies what
follows in C; part of the prohibition with respect to these presumptively
idolatrous images is their beholding. While the editorial logic of the peric-
ope (read as a whole) puts exception (B) before rule (C), the literary
effect is heightened: the consecration upon the ascent of an image that
forbids it to the Jewish gaze (‘‘when they go up’’) is reversed upon its
comeuppance or descent (‘‘when they go down’’). It is following this that
our tannaitic tradition is cited.68
What was a blanket prohibition now grants the opportunity to look in
the right circumstances. These are those that cannot possibly be con-
ceived of as cultic viewing, and which allow the Jewish witnessing of
idoloclasm. The rise and fall of an idol is choreographed via two Jewish
ocular responses based on two different biblical verses mandating looking
away and looking toward (Lev 19.14; Ps 37.34). It is hard not to think
about what later scholars refer to as damnatio memoriae—desecration or
destruction of imperial images, or in later times similar destruction of
‘‘idols’’ by Christians—gleefully documented in various sources.69
Even if a viewer was thought to absorb what was seen, we can under-
stand (as the Yerushalmi’s editor did) that in certain contexts an image’s
status and power are neutralized.70 R. Yoh. anan, who is demonstrably
sensitive to the way worship invests an image with (illicit) sanctity (in
65. The question ‘‘why are icons forbidden?’’ (A) continues to address the
concerns of the underlying mishnah (mAZ 3.1). The Yerushalmi goes on to nar-
row and refine the worship-based criteria of the prohibition, distinguishing
between categories of images that can be presumptively identified as subject to
worship (e.g., imperial cult images vs. images of local authorities).
66. See Lieberman, Tosefta ki-fshutah, 3:282–83.
67. E.g., Pliny the Younger, Letters, 10.96–97.
68. It is a blend of the Sifra Kedoshim 1 (ed. Weiss, 87a) and tShab 17.1.
69. E.g., Eusebius, Life of Constantine, 3.54–57. See Eric R. Varner, Mutilation
and Transformation: Damnatio Memoriae and Roman Imperial Portraiture, Monumenta
Graeca et Romana (Leiden, 2004).
70. Cf. mAZ 3.4.
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A), ‘‘permits’’ looking with a prooftext that goes so far as to prophesy
that those who turn to God shall see the wicked fall. This is similar to
Eusebius’s emphatically visual descriptions of Jewish and pagan down-
fall as visible witness (to both victims and Christians) to fulfillment of
God’s promises.71 In this regard, one might say that the gaze participates
somehow in the destruction itself.72 That looking is crucial here rather
than incidental or merely a rigoristic precaution is evinced by the implica-
tion in R. Yoh. anan’s statement (B)—that the default position is to not
look at idols—as well as by the way sight repeatedly surfaces in this
portion of the tractate.
What immediately follows these halakhic deliberations is obviously
linked by the thematic of this idolatrous visuality: ‘‘When R. Nah. um bar
Simai died, they covered the icons (ikonta) with mats. They said, just as
he did not look (h. amtun) at them when he was alive, so he should not
look (yah. minun) at them during death.’’ A few lines later we are informed
that this is the rabbi who was called ‘‘Nah. um the holy of holies’’ ‘‘because
he did not gaze at the image on a coin (shelo’ hibit betsurat matbea‘) his
whole life.’’73 Even if such behavior was seen as super-saintly, as is clear
from R. Nah. um’s title, it is also one very logical outcome of a ban on idol
viewing. In spurning all images it does not distinguish between cultic
and other images. Undeniably, it thereby answers the potential problem
inherent in making that very distinction: how to identify the status of an
image without perchance coming to gaze upon an idol?
What is so interesting about R. Nah. um’s vigilance, even postmortem,
is the implication that the dead continue to see. The Yerushalmi addresses
this and concludes that the righteous dead do actually see and hear. In
making this determination the Yerushalmi highlights sensory perception—
reminding us of what is at stake in the refusal to see. Following this
exemplary anecdote is the report that Rabbi was called ‘‘our holy rabbi’’
because he never gazed (shelo’ hibit) upon his circumcision. While one
could understand the refusal to look at the penis as a precaution against
71. Eusebius, Life of Constantine, 3.54–57; Eusebius, Theophany 1.18; 4.3, 16,
20.
72. The rabbis even invest the removal of idolatry with liturgical significance
as per mBer 9.1 and tBer 6.2.
73. yAZ 3.1, 42c (par. yMeg 1.11, 72b.) Given that R. Yoh. anan has just
implied that all looking at idols is forbidden other than in specific circumstances,
why does R. Nah. um bar Simai deserve special praise? This is probably due to R.
Nah. um’s abstention even from images on coins (a few lines below). Given that
the Yerushalmi does distinguish idols from images in terms of veneration, it is
questionable whether images (even of gods) on coins fall into the category of idol.
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touching, it seems, especially in this context, hard to ignore the common
view that vision itself was intertwined with touch.74 That the rabbis
understood the gaze as haptic is graphically expressed in yH. al 2.4, 58c,
which equates looking at female genitalia with intercourse.75
The feasibility of walking around in the Mediterranean and managing
to avoid casting one’s eye on images is hard to imagine, perhaps as hard
to imagine as going through one’s life without gazing upon the body. And
yet we know that late antique people trained their bodies—including their
eyes—in precisely such ways.76 In the fourth century, John Chrysostom
recommended ocular dieting, so that one ‘‘let the eyes fast . . . for looking
is the food of the eyes.’’77 Whether as a form of askesis or as self-protection
or both, rabbis, Church fathers, and monks guarded their gazes.
Thus when it came to idolatry, Clement warned polytheists that they
sinned not only in making images but also by looking at, or even hearing
about, them.78 For Clement, as for other apologists, this was connected to
the very illogic of worshipping objects ‘‘apprehended by sight,’’ whether
humanly produced or found naturally.79 Cyprian situates the sin of idola-
try amid a vivid array of sights—good, bad, ugly, benign, beneficent, and
dangerous.80 Elsewhere he castigates idol worshippers in visual terms,
enumerating ‘‘looking upon idols’’ as part of the sin and recommending
repentant tears as a way to wash such sinful eyes.81
A deep sense of the participatory nature of vision coalesced around an
abhorrence of the spectacles. Tertullian reasoned that by watching one
74. mNid 2.1 (par. bNid 13a) exhorts men not to touch their genetalia.
75. In the Babylonian parallel (bShab 118b) this equivalence is arguably
enhanced when the Talmud adds, ‘‘Rabbi’s hand never went under his tunic.’’
Note that the heightened sacred accolade of the innermost sanctum (‘‘holy of
holies’’ as opposed to ‘‘holy’’) is awarded to the one whose eyes are averted from
idols. A similar hierarchy and juxtaposition of gaze aversion in an erotic and
idolatrous contexts is present in bBer 61a.
76. On guarding the monastic gaze, see Pachomius, Precepts 2, in Armand
Boon, Pachomiana latina: Règle et épitres de saint Pachôme, épitre de saint Théodore et
Liber de saint Orsiesius, texte latin de saint Jérôme (Louvain, 1932), 13; Shenoute,
Canon 3, codex YA 257–58.
77. E.g., John Chrysostom, Homilies Concerning the Statues, 3.11.
78. Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus 4.
79. Clement, Protrepticus 4, trans. G. W. Butterworth (Cambridge, Mass.,
1919), 142–43.
80. Cyprian, Epistola ad Donatum de gratia Dei.
81. Cyprian, The Lapsed, 30. He also points out (ibid., 28) that part of the sin
is being seen worshipping. This is a concern for the rabbis (e.g., tAZ 6.6, cf.
Augustine, Ep. 153) present even when one is not actually sinning (i.e., mar’it
‘ayin, e.g., mShab 19.6, mKil 9.2, yYev 2.4, 3d; bBets 9a).
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not only became violent but that one was thereby implicated in the vio-
lence: intromissive visual theory at work.82 Athenagoras put it bluntly,
‘‘We see little difference between watching a man being put to death and
killing him. So we have given up such spectacles.’’83 Sight is not pas-
sive—it participates in, even affects, reality. The witness of violence
becomes party to it. So, too, the rabbis declared that ‘‘he who sits in the
stadium, behold this one is a murderer.’’84
Those such as Tertullian did not only inveigh against bad sights but
also attempted to divert the gaze with the promise of goodly sights.85
Tertullian’s strategy recalls that of the Yerushalmi; he redirects the good
Christian gaze away from the spectacles by promising righteous (non-)
viewers the tantalizing ‘‘free sight’’ of the lurid and graphic writhing of
sinners being punished (this is a good kind of violent spectacle).86 The
extramissive nature of vision allows us to understand these as punishing
gazes. It was not just the viewer who was impacted by seeing but also the
visual object. It is to this insight about the active power of the gaze that
we now turn.
LOOKING AWRY: Y‘AVODAH ZARAH 3.8, 43B
In a later passage in the same tractate of yAZ we find a trio of anecdotes
about promenading pairs of rabbis that encounter idols.87 In each case a
rabbi asks his senior colleague about the appropriate behavior in the face
of the image. In the first two instances, the latter tells the former to ‘‘pass
in front of it and blind its eyes.’’88 In the final anecdote of the trilogy, R.
Jacob bar Idi says the following in answer R. Joshua b. Levi’s inquiry:
82. Tertullian, De Spectaculis, 15.2–6.
83. Athenagoras, A Plea for the Christians 35.5, trans. C. C. Richardson (Phila-
delphia, 2006), 338. See also Theophilious of Antioch, Theophilus to Autolycus 3.15.
84. tAZ 2.7. That this pronouncement does not only point to homicidal omis-
sion in light of the exception to the rule that follows which allows one to go to
the stadium to save lives is clear from the way it is also linked to participation in
idolatry (tAZ 2.5) and to ‘‘seeing the sorcerers and enchanters’’ (tAZ 2.6).
85. Tertullian, De Spectaculis, 30.
86. De Spectaculis 30 and see ibid., 29. Cf. LevR 13.3 (ed. Margaliot, 1:277) in
which the reward of those righteous persons who refrain from watching the spec-
tacles of wild animals in combat is the viewing of the Behemot and Leviathan
fighting in the world to come. See David Frankfurter, ‘‘Martyrology and the
Prurient Gaze,’’ Journal of Early Christian Studies 17.2 (2009 ): 215–45. On escha-
tological spectacle in Tertullian and Jewish sources, see Joshua Levinson, ‘‘The
Athlete of Piety: Fatal Fictions in Rabbinic Literature’’ (Hebrew), Tarbiz 68
(1999): 61–86 and references therein.
87. The underlying mishnah concerns forbidden benefit (hana’ah).
88. yAZ 3.8, 43b.
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‘‘Nah. um, the holy of holies, passed, and will you not pass? Pass in front
of it and blind its eyes.’’89 The memory of the visual virtuoso R. Nah. um
bar Simai is the paradoxical exemplar for passing in front of the image.
The logic here seems to run along the following lines: If even such an
unusually visually vigilant sage had no problem passing in front of such
images, who are you to quibble? But of what does the injunction to ‘‘pass
in front of it and blind its eyes’’ consist? Before answering this question
let us consider, along with the Yerushalmi, what the opposite of this
behavior might be.
CONTRASTIVE VISUAL PIETIES: YMO‘ED KATAN 3.7,
83C AND YBIKURIM 3.3, 65C–D
A variation of this story is embedded in a different narrative context, in
yMK 3.7, 83c, with instructive additional elements.90 The story features
R. Yoh. anan walking along with R. Jacob bar Idi (the same person who
invokes Nah. um bar Simai). They encounter R. Elazar; Yoh. anan is
insulted when Elazar sees him (h. ame leh) and runs away instead extend-
ing the customary deference.91 In a midrashic explanation that stresses
vision, R. Jacob argues that unlike Palestinian rabbis, the Babylonians
express respect toward their teachers by fulfilling the verse, ‘‘the young
men saw (ra’uni) me and withdrew (Job 29.8).’’ This is the opposite of
the apparently customary (Palestinian) greeting, such as repeatedly
emphasized in a veritable manual for rabbinic respect rituals in yBik 3.3,
65c–d.92 Here, Lev 19.32, ‘‘you shall rise before the hoary head and honor
the face of the elder,’’ is the basis for a basic rule of rising and greeting
the rabbinic teacher.
Amid its halakhic determinations yBik 3.3, 65c–d presents several
anecdotes about rabbis who not only rise upon seeing their masters but
also deliberately try to position themselves so that they might ‘‘see’’ them
and then ‘‘rise.’’93 We witness a shift from the tannaitic rule in which
89. Ibid. In bAZ 50a–b R. Yohanan invokes the holy Nah. um to encourage
people not to refrain from walking on flagstones made out of recycled idolatry
(mercurius). Compare Mark the Deacon, Life of Poryphry, 76, in which marble
from a destroyed temple is recycled into flagstones so as to be desecrated by
being trodden underfoot, which caused people not to walk on them.
90. Par. yBer 2.1, 4b; yShek 2.6, 47a; bYev 96b–97a. On this anecdote, see
Seth Schwartz, Were the Jews a Mediterranean Society? Reciprocity and Solidarity in
Ancient Judaism (Princeton, N.J., 2010), 135–36; Fine, Art and Judaism, 114.
91. Compare yKil 9.3, 32b in which R. Ishmael is offended by R. H. iya’s fail-
ure to greet him.
92. However, see bKid 33b.
93. For an analysis of this sugya, see Schwartz, Were the Jews a Mediterranean
Society?, 149–61.
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rising is a response to the visual encounter, to the notion that that sight of
the sage can itself be a worthy goal.94 Such emphasis on seeing the sage,
and on attendant forms of veneration, puts us in the realm of visual piety,
defined by Georgia Frank as ‘‘practices in which a lingering gaze conjures
a sacred presence.’’95
yBik 3.3, 65c–d sharpens this focus on visual piety by contrastive
means. It presents an anecdote of two amoraim who conspicuously con-
tinue to study instead of rising and greeting a Jewish official who bought
his office. To such a pretender, these rabbis apply Ex 22.20 forbidding
the making of idols of silver and gold, as well as Hab 2.19, ‘‘Woe to him
who says to a wooden thing, Awake! To a dumb stone, arise! Can this
give revelation?’’96 If the good visual object (the sage) carries with it
attendant visual pieties, then the bad visual object is the false idol who
claims veneration where it is undeserved.97 Deliberate and conspicuous
disrespect is mandated.
EYE-BLINDING BEHAVIOR: YMOED KATAN 3.7,
83C AND Y‘AVODAH ZARAH 3.8, 43B
In yMK 3.7, 83c a similar strategy of contrast is deployed. Babylonian-
styled visual veneration of ‘‘seeing and fleeing’’ is contrasted with behav-
ior appropriate toward an idol. After R. Yoh. anan complains to R. Jacob
bar Idi about R. Elazar’s disrespectful behavior, the pair go on to encoun-
ter an idolatrous image. When R. Jacob asks how they should proceed,
R. Yoh. anan answers with the stock phrase: ‘‘Would you accord it honor?
Rather pass in front of it and blind its eye (same ‘eneh).’’ The phrase ‘‘blind
its eye’’ has been understood in various ways. Some have revised it to
‘‘blind your eye,’’ a form of ‘‘looking away,’’ in order to harmonize it with
R. Nah. um’s visual vigilance. Particularly in light of the associated anec-
dotes in which Nah. um bar Simai is invoked, this might suggest passing
in front of the idol but with an averted gaze.98 Others read straightfor-
94. For the tannaitic treatment of rituals of respect including rising before the
sage, see Sifra Kedoshim 3.7 (tMeg 3.4). The source also prohibits one from ‘‘clos-
ing one’s eyes as if one has not seen’’ the ‘‘elder’’ in order to escape the obligation
to rise.
95. Frank, The Memory of the Eyes, 174.
96. Jacob of Kefar Nevoraya contrasts the pretender/idol in Hab 2.19 with
the rabbi/God in Hab 2.20, ‘‘And the Lord is in his holy sanctuary,’’ claiming that
the latter refers to R. Yitsh. ak bar El‘azar while he is in a synagogue.
97. The text adds ‘‘does he know how to teach?’’ and forbids rising for, or
calling, such a person ‘‘rabbi.’’
98. Peter Schäfer, ‘‘Jews and Gentiles in Yerushalmi Avodah Zarah,’’ in The
Talmud Yerushalmi and Greco-Roman Culture, vol. 3, ed. C. Hezser and P. Schäfer
(Tübingen, 2002), 348 (‘‘close [your] eyes’’), and Christine Hayes, Between the
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wardly as ‘‘blind its eye.’’99 The material evidence of late antique icono-
clasm against all kinds of images reveals that the eyes were among the
most often struck organs, showing how ‘‘the desecration of vital sensory
organs . . . negates the ‘power’ of these images to see.’’100 However, most
have understood ‘‘blind its eye’’ metaphorically, as an instruction to act
with deliberate disrespect that is tantamount to defacing the image.101 In
yMK 3.7, 83c, R. Yoh. anan must acknowledge that walking up to an
object of worship (with no obeisance) constitutes this form of disrespect.
He must therefore concede that by contrast R. El‘azar’s disappearing act
was indeed a form of veneration.
EYE BLINDING THROUGH EXTRAMISSIVE
VIEWING: SONG RABBAH 2.5
How is this eye blinding accomplished? An additional Palestinian source
indicates that the eye of the viewer works extramissively to blind the
idol’s eye. Here the priest of an idol is said to have cast a malevolent
(literally, ‘‘narrow’’) eye upon his cult image (she-haytah ‘eno tsarah).102
Babylonian and Pastinian Talmuds: Accounting for Halakhic Difference in Selected Sugyot
from Tractate Avodah Zarah (Oxford, 1997), 214–15, n. 34; Schwartz, Imperialism,
173.
99. Fine, Art and Judaism, 113–14: ‘‘put its eyes out.’’ To my knowledge, no
one reads this literally, as mandating an act of iconoclasm.
100. See Varner, Mutilation and Transformation, 3. See also ibid., 217. Such
mutilation makes the sensory powerlessness of idols visible as per the oft-cited
critique that ‘‘they have eyes but do not see’’ (Ps 135.16).
101. While this last translation is in fact the literal one, it is discomfiting and
hard to assimilate with the mostly noniconoclastic Palestinian amoraic trend. See
Blidstein, ‘‘Rabbi Yohanan, Idolatry and Public Privilege,’’ 158, ‘‘spit in its eye’’;
Fine’s discussion of this phrase in the context of Jewish resistance to the impe-
rium (Fine, Art and Judaism,114); Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestin-
ian Aramaic, has ‘‘in fig. sense to ignore.’’ Same ‘eneh is also used in the context of
corruption and bribery and personal injury law, e.g., mBK 8.7. In tannaitic
sources the expression is used in the context of personal injury. In most other
iterations in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Syriac this word combination is either used
adjectively to describe blindness or blind people, or (verbally) to refer to meta-
phorical acts of blinding—such as in bribery (e.g., Deut 16.19, ‘‘a bribe blinds
the eyes of the wise’’). However, in contexts related to idolatrous images, the
Bavli deploys the phrase in a literal fashion. Thus in b‘AZ 43b (par bRH. 24b)
Samuel instructs Rav Judah, who has a seal with a protruding image on it, to
‘‘blind its eye’’ and deface the image, thereby ‘‘nullifying’’ it and making it permis-
sible for use. What may be a related expression, usually directed at Satan, is ‘‘an
arrow in your/his eye’’ (bKid 81a, 30a, bSuk 39a, bMen 62a). The eye in this
context seems to be related to the evil eye.
102. SongR 2.5 (ed. Vilna). For partial parallels, see yBer 9.2, 13d, ySan 11.5,
30b. In GenR 38.13 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 3:360–64) Abraham uses similar lan-
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The anecdote relates how he would embarrass potential worshippers, dis-
couraging them from worshipping it. The priest describes what he does:
‘‘I take my payment and I blind its eye.’’103 This is clearly not a literal act
of iconoclasm, and it is terminologically and causally related to the priest’s
malevolent gaze toward his ostensible object of veneration. It is tempting
to think that this expression, which describes what might called an ‘‘ocu-
loclastic gaze,’’ might have its source in acts of image desecration or vio-
lence so often expressed by gouging out the eyes of images. Such literal
acts of violence were another way to cut off the circuit of the reciprocal
gaze upon which image worship depended.
In order to understand the power of the malignant gaze, we might also
look to apotropaic images designed to neutralize the evil eye, which were
plentiful in late antique Palestine, Syria, and Egypt.104 These often depict
spears, snakes, and other creatures attacking and piercing an eye (itself
sometimes depicted as bleeding or weeping). The evil eye is neutralized
by blinding.
The narrative of the idol and the priest shows that the effect of the
priest’s ‘‘narrow eye’’ was to ‘‘blind the eye’’ of the idol. An extramissive
gaze strikes the cult image at its core—in its eyes—negating its capacity
‘‘to look back’’ at the cultic viewer.105 In the narrative, the priest also
seeks to accomplish this with caustic comments to his constituents, for
example, ‘‘Someone as old as you worships something that is but a few
days old!’’ In sapping the image of its power he also takes away its wor-
shippers’ capacity to receive it, another strike at the reciprocal viewing.
The story therefore not only uses an extramissive model of vision but also
turns the more specific dynamic of sacred viewing on its head.
This eye-blinding negation of the image is the behavior recommended
by R. Yoh. anan (along with all of the senior sages of the three pairs who
guage and tactics to dissuade potential image consumers from buying idols. He
ends up committing physical (not just metaphorical) iconoclasm.
103. Cf. bBB 109b–110a.
104. There are two examples of such eyes among the ceiling tiles in the Dura
Europos synagogue. See Carl H. Kraeling, The Synagogue, vol. 8, part 1 (New
York, 1979), 41–45, 48–49, figs. 11–12, and Karen B. Stern, ‘‘Mapping Devotion
in Roman Dura Europos: A Reconsideration of the Synagogue Ceiling,’’ American
Journal of Archaeology 114.3 (2010): 473–504. Kraeling suggests that these two
designs are of good and evil eyes. The latter is depicted with knives, snakes, and
insects attacking it. See further Testament of Solomon 18.25.
105. GenR 87.5 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 3:1068) describes how Potiphar’s wife
covers the face of an idol above her bed (presumably so it shouldn’t witness her
adultery). Joseph warns that she ought to be far more concerned about the one
whose ‘‘eyes . . . run forth throughout the whole earth (Zech 4.10).’’
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encounter idols). Perhaps something of the power of this confrontational
viewing practice is present in an anecdote about R. Yoh. anan’s funeral:
‘‘When R. Yoh. anan died, the icons folded over. They said it was because
no icon that was like him.’’106 This, together with Nah. um bar Simai’s
refusal to gaze at idols in death as in life, appears in the same series of
rabbinic funerary legends consisting of postmortem miracles that strike
at the heart of Roman imperial symbols. The whole unit follows on the
heels of our prohibition against looking at idols. In the narrative in yMK
3.7, 83c, R. Yoh. anan is implicitly cast as an icon of sorts to which visual
piety is due and which is contrasted with the deserved disrespectful treat-
ment toward the idol. Here, he continues in death as in life, confronting
idolatry (rather than avoiding it) and perhaps even becoming an object
of its piety.107 Or perhaps the icons bow to R. Yoh. anan’s better looks.108
The implication is that R. Yoh. anan somehow registers for the icons, who
are shamed into bowing to his superior iconicity.109 This account of his
death follows in close proximity to that of R. Nah. um bar Simai, who took
the route of ocular aversion rather than confrontation.
Side by side (at least editorially speaking) we have two models for idol
viewing—avoidance (looking away) and confrontation (looking awry).
In the later Palestinian sources we have so far seen evidence of (1) visual
prohibition or total asceticism; (2) and situational permission to look and
circumstantial permission to look down upon; and (3) a disrespectful
106. yAZ 3.1, 42c (par. bMK 25b). Just before this we find, ‘‘when R. H. anan
died the statues bent over.’’
107. An unusually iconoclastic anecdote also features R. Yoh. anan as the per-
son who instructs Bar Derosai to break the images (tsalmaya) in the bathhouses
(yAZ 4.4, 43d). See Schäfer, ‘‘Jews and Gentiles in Yerushalmi Avodah Zarah,’’
350.
108. My interpretation rests partly on implication. It also rests, first, on this
anecdote’s proximity to the R. Nah. um Bar Simai funeral anecdote, which indi-
cates the visual proximity of images to the funeral procession and dead sage; and
second, on the proximity and terminological similarity of yAZ 3.1, 42b, in which
R. Yoh. anan opines about (not) looking at images.
109. For a reverse dynamic, in which idols turn around and nullify their wor-
shippers, see yAZ 4.7, 44a: ‘‘R. Nah. man in the name of R. Mana: ‘In the time to
come idols will come and spit in the face of those who worship idols and cause
them to be nullified from the world . . . R. Nah. man in the name of R. Mana, ‘in
the time to come idols will come and bow down before the holy one, blessed be
he and then be nullified from the world.’ ’’ See mAZ 4.5 on the insufficiency of
spitting to technically nullify the idolatrous nature of an image. Cf. yAZ 4.4, 44a
(par. bAZ 43a), in which Bar Kapara urges a gentile boy to spit or urinate upon
an idolatrous image on a ring.
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gaze. In the last instance, the viewing is active and potentially damaging
and is contrasted with appropriate visual pieties to sages.
LITURGICAL LOOKING
A final example of looking awry at idols finds its origins in the lists of
‘‘vision’’ blessings in mBer 9.1–2 and tBer 6.2–6.110 An all too brief foray
into these novel liturgical formulae must suffice. In these blessings, the
rabbinic viewer is brought through a series of sights including the miracu-
lous, the aesthetic, meteorological, topographical, astronomical, anthro-
pological, zoological, arboreal, and the marine. For each sight (re’iyah)
the utterance (amirah) of a blessing is mandated. These utterances are not
passive responses to what is seen; they actively bring various components
of the viewscape into focus, effecting that which they purport to describe.111
Importantly, when read as a textual unit, each list, with its iteration of
the phrase ‘‘ha-ro’eh X, omer Y,’’ constitutes an instruction manual on how
to perform vision. In other words, the ostensibly responsive nature of
these blessings ought not occlude the fact that in their careful writing and
instruction, these texts themselves anticipate and frame vision before the
occurrence of any actual encounter. The content of the tannaitic list poses
itself as if in response to spontaneous events, but in its careful composi-
tion it is anything but spontaneous.
Among the visual objects effected liturgically are idols. The Mishnah
instructs: ‘‘[One who sees] a place from which idolatry had been
uprooted says, ‘blessed is he who uprooted idolatry from our land.’ ’’112
110. For an excellent analysis of these ‘‘vision blessings’’ in terms of their rela-
tionship to the other blessings, see Ishay Rosen-Zvi, ‘‘Responsive Blessings and
the Development of the Tannaitic Liturgical System’’ (Hebrew), Jewish Studies:
An Internet Journal 7 (2008): 1–29.
111. Such collaboration of verbal and visual techniques was also crucial to the
work of Christian pilgrimage in the enlivening of contemporary locations with
biblical pasts. On ritual, performance, and the senses in late antique Christian
sources, see Georgia Frank, ‘‘Taste and See: The Eucharist and the Eyes of Faith
in the Fourth Century,’’ Church History 70.4 (2001): 619–43. In addition, there is
much evidence from neurocognitive, psychological, and linguistic studies to sug-
gest that what humans see is very much a function of what and how they are
trained to see, and that the brain of the viewer may contribute more to vision
than the sense data given at any moment. See Nicholas Wade and Michael
Swanston, Visual perception: An Introduction (Philadelphia, 2001), and David H.
Hubel Eye, Brain, and Vision (New York, 1995). In this sense, blessings might be
understood as not just a discursive aspect of a scopic regime but rather as having
reality-granting effect themselves.
112. mBer 9.1.
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The Tosefta presents a slightly different formulation for seeing the
remains of idolatry and provides for an additional scenario:
A. One who sees idolatry says: ‘‘blessed is he who is slow to anger.’’
B. [One who sees] a place from which idolatry was uprooted says:
‘‘blessed is he who uprooted idolatry from our land. May it be your
will Lord our God that idolatry be uprooted from all places in Israel
and turn the heart of your servants to serve you.’’ (tBer 6.2)
These halakhot register and ritualize both the visible presence and
absence of an idol. The formula for the former (tBer 6.2A) is a curse; the
object of sight is liturgically erased. For the blessing over sight of idola-
try’s removal, the Tosefta includes a longer formula which is far broader
in its hopes for the total annihilation for all idolatry. By seeing and utter-
ing the blessing or curse, the spectator entreats God to carry out the
physical act: seeing and uttering is thus also proscriptive.113
These collections of sight-triggered and constituting blessings are
greatly expanded in later sources. For example, what starts life as ‘‘one
who sees a place where miracles had been done for Israel’’ (mBer 9.1)
becomes the basis for veritable sight-seeing itineraries whose liturgical
and performative visual techniques bear striking affinities to those in
Christian pilgrimage sources.114 Similar expansions occur with respect to
seeing idolatry and the signs of its removal.
The Yerushalmi expands mBer 9.1 (incorporating tBer 6.2B) into three
types of visual encounters of idolatry’s removal, each with its own liturgi-
cal formula: (1) one in which all idolatry is wiped out of the land; (2) one
in which it is uprooted from only one place; and (3) one in which it is
uprooted in one place only to be reestablished in another.115 It also goes
on to extend the requirement to recite upon seeing idolatry and its erasure
even outside the land of Israel.
yBerakhot’s attention to the destruction and reemergence of idolatrous
113. In second- or third-century late Roman Palestine it is unlikely that more
actively destructive behavior than prayerful gazing would have been contem-
plated. Nullification (bitul) of an idol (rendering it permissible) could only be
accomplished by its owner. In other hypothetical scenarios the rabbis include
abandoned (and potentially usable) idols (or fragments thereof) which are con-
signed to destruction (e.g., mAZ 3.3). However, in these scenarios the property
is ownerless.
114. yBer 9.1, 12d, bBer 54a. I develop this idea in ‘‘Pilgrimage Itineraries:
Seeing the Past through Rabbinic Eyes,’’ JSQ 19 (2012): 1–33.
115. yBer 9.1, 13b (par. bBer 57b).
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sites finds companionship with the scenario in yAZ 3.8, 43b. Both of
these sources echo with what we know of the upheaval of the material
landscape of fourth-century Palestine. This was a time of removal and
replacement (and sometimes recycling) of ‘‘pagan’’ objects with Christian
ones.116 In this context in which idolatry shifted rather than disappeared,
an imagined future of its total erasure from the land of Israel, and even
beyond, must have been particularly appealing.117 The kind of active
seeing guaranteed by late antique understandings of extramissive vision
allowed a minority to project its alternative vision upon a shifting view-
scape whose material elements were largely controlled by others. Liturgi-
cal (or wishful) looking, then, is another example of an active gaze that
affects, as much as it effects, the object of its glare.
CONCLUSION
Thus far I have laid out several modes of visually encountering idols.
Perhaps the most idealized is gaze aversion, but there is also a form of
gazing in situations in which the idol’s status is compromised. We also
find a mode of deliberately defiant looking. And finally, rabbinic texts
show liturgical methods of negating (the sight of) idols, ultimately—in
the Yerushalmi’s dearest hopes—quite completely from the land. Thus
we have come full circle from the notion that to look at an idol can be to
worship it, to the notion that to look at an idol can be to denigrate it. This
makes sense in a world in which vision can affect viewer and viewed.
I have treated the viewing strategies that ‘‘idols’’ elicited and which in
turn helped to constitute ‘‘idols.’’ The archaeological record makes it clear
that people in places such as Sepphoris, Scythopolis, Beth Shean, or
Caesarea would have encountered a variety of images from statues to
116. On the material and textual evidence, see Nicole Belayche, Iudaea-
Palaestina: The Pagan Cults in Roman Palestine (Second to Fourth Century) (Tübingen,
2001); Béatrice Caseau, ‘‘Sacred Landscape,’’ in Interpreting Late Antiquity: Essays
on the Postclassical World, ed. G. W. Bowersock, P. Brown, and Oleg G. (Cam-
bridge, 2001), 30. On Christian destruction of pagan cult images and spaces, see
Eusebius, Life of Constantine 3.26–28 and Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History 5. For a
rabbinic narrative about spolia, see bAZ 50a–b. For biblical curses to be recited
upon ‘‘passing in front of a house of idolatry,’’ as well as upon ‘‘seeing them
sacrificing to idolatry’’ (as per the fourth-century amora R. Yose b. Abun), see
yBer 9.1, 63b. On reciting ‘‘blessed is he who is slow to anger’’ when ‘‘one sees
mercurius,’’ see yBer 9.1, 12d and bBer 54b.
117. Religio-political shifts in the Palestinian viewscape have as much explan-
atory power over the Yerushalmi’s expansions of idolatrous sites as its general
hermeneutic bent toward dialectical elaboration of tannaitic and biblical mate-
rials.
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mosaics to images on more modest domestic objects like oil lamps. If, as
Jaś Elsner has argued, our contemporary impulse to designate images
one way or another (as Jewish, Christian, or pagan) is beset with prob-
lems and does a certain violence to the complexity and fluidity of the way
objects appeared to and functioned for their contemporaneous viewers
and users, then this makes even more vivid the urgency with which some
ancients, such as rabbis, must have desired to know and control their
material world.118 In a basic sense the project of thinking through ‘avodah
zarah was part of an attempt to control the environment, at the very least
on epistemic and ontic levels. The very designation of an object as an
‘‘idol’’ rabbinized it, even if under the veil of prohibition.
Such an object was to be viewed—literally—rabbinically (even for
those rabbis who advocated that one should not look at all). Like Philo,
like the Church fathers, rabbis increasingly sought to cultivate ways of
seeing that marked not only the world and its objects but also them-
selves.119 This is, in part, how we might understand the later valorization
and honorific sanctification of visual virtuosos such as R. Nah. um bar
Simai and R. Judah. In general, the rabbinic preoccupation with idolatry
and its viewing is part of a larger effort to mark the gaze as Jewish. This
gaze was, even at its ostensibly most disengaged and prohibitive, still
deeply indebted to Greco-Roman visual theories, if not visual pieties.
Vision, the sensory apprehension of an object, is never solely neutral or
natural. The anxieties about the power of others’ sacred images make
their way into rabbinic texts in the vocabulary of idolatry and in the
attempt to shape their visual encounter.
118. Jaś Elsner, ‘‘Archaeologies and Agendas: Reflections on Late Antique
Jewish Art and Early Christian Art,’’ Journal of Roman Studies 93 (2003): 114–28.
119. For an analysis of visuality that attends to the political aspects of vision
by minorities under empire, see Simon Goldhill, ‘‘The Erotic Eye: Visual Stimula-
tion and Cultural Conflict,’’ in Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second
Sophistic and the Development of Empire, ed. S. Goldhill (Cambridge, 2001), 154–94.
For warnings to not wander about the streets idly and ‘‘gaze at the vain spectacles
of those who behave badly’’ and to train the mind on things proper, see Didascalia
Apostolorum, 8 and 14, The Didascalia Apostolorum in Syriac, vol. 1, chaps. 1–10,
trans. A. Vööbus, Corpus scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 401, Scriptores
Syri 176 (Leuven, 1979), 8, 14.
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